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I. Introduction  
 
Mark Wallinger’s State Britain was installed in the Tate Britain art gallery in London in 
January 2007 (figure one). The artwork was a meticulous recreation of materials that had 
been removed by the police under the Serious and Organised Crime Act 2005 (‘SOCPA’) 
from a longstanding demonstration in Parliament Square by Brian Haw (figure three). The 
work was located so that it bisected the boundary of a zone that had been created by SOCPA 
for the purposes of ensuring the proper operation of Parliament of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
1
 The border created by the legislation was not physically 
demarcated in any way. Yet, inside the zone it bounded a government minister could specify 
an area within which the police had increased powers to regulate demonstrations. Mark 
Wallinger marked out the segment of the boundary that passed through Tate Britain with a 
black line on the floor of the gallery (figures two and four). Wallinger’s work was regarded 
by some as simply an eviscerated copy of Haw’s demonstration. However, I propose that 
because of the nature of the boundary it crossed the work invited a critical engagement with 
the legislation without becoming subject to SOCPA and attracting the “super performative” 
force of the law.
2
 My argument is that as an appropriation of Haw’s protest, when approached 
in terms of the performative after Jacques Derrida, Wallinger’s work oscillated between 
being art and a political protest.
3
 Wallinger’s work focused attention on the contingencies of 
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where the boundaries created under the legislation were drawn and how what amounted to a 
demonstration for the purposes of the Act was determined. The juxtaposition of State Britain 
with SOCPA invited the work to be understood not only in terms of the past and its similarity 
to Haw’s protest but also provoked troubling questions about whether it might in the future 
be regulated as a demonstration.  
 
[Insert figure 1. State Britain, 2007. Mixed media installation, 5.7 x 43 x 1.9m (approx). 
Detail, installation at Tate Britain, 2007. Photograph by David Morgan. Courtesy the artist 
and Hauser & Wirth.] 
 
Wallinger’s positioning of State Britain might be characterised as a deliberate provocation of 
SOCPA and yet another example of the mutual incomprehension, if not outright antagonism, 
between visual art and positive law. Yet, this would be to take an overly reductive approach 
to the complex relationship between the two spheres.
4
 The Act illustrated that whilst the law 
may be reluctant to acknowledge the interest it takes in art it has “always had a visual policy, 
it has always understood the importance of the governance of images for the maintenance of 
the social bond.” 5 For its part, art is created, distributed, marketed, sold and preserved within 
contexts created and regulated by legal systems.
6
 State Britain didn’t only invite reflection on  
the restriction of protest by SOCPA in legal terms. The performative nature of Wallinger’s 
work drew attention to the way in which the enforcement of the legislation was framed by the 
established aesthetic values of the parliamentary democracy within which SOCPA was 
enacted. In this way, State Britain not only created a context that increased awareness of the 
violence of black letter law but also of the way in which the organization, conventions and 
theories of art may be implicated in shoring up established forms of democracy. My 
argument is that Wallinger’s work not only drew attention to the contingent nature of the 
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boundaries constructed by the law in the regulation of society but also to the way they were 
entangled in wider social values. State Britain did not simply provide a space to become 
aware of the false necessity of these norms but also, and equally importantly, the way in 
which established legal and aesthetic frameworks constrain the possibilities of challenging 
the political establishment. The work exemplified the way that art, when understood in 
performative terms, may be positioned to intersect with the law so as to open a critical 
engagement with the way society is controlled.   
 
[Insert figure 2. State Britain, 2007. Mixed media installation, 5.7 x 43 x 1.9m (approx). 
Detail, installation at Tate Britain, 2007. Photograph by David Morgan. Courtesy the artist 
and Hauser & Wirth.] 
 
II. Parliament and Protest 
 
Brian Haw began his permanent protest camp in Parliament Square in June 2001 in 
opposition to the economic sanctions against Iraq.  Despite various efforts to remove or 
restrict his demonstration Haw remained there until shortly before his death in 2011. 
Parliament Square is located to the northwest of the Palace of Westminster, which is 
commonly referred to as the Houses of Parliament. Traffic circulates around an open grassed 
area at its center, which is called Parliament Square Garden. Haw positioned his protest along 
the pavement bordering the garden so that it was opposite one of the entrances to the Houses 
of Parliament (figure three). By 2006 his protest had expanded into a wide array of materials 
that stretched for 40 meters. It included a tarpaulin shelter, tea-making area and items that 
ranged from bold, large-scale work such as placards through to information boards, 
photocopied war zone reports and newspaper articles that needed to be seen close-up (figure 
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four). Initially efforts to remove the politically strident protest were ineffective but the 
enactment of SOCPA enabled restrictions to be imposed on the size of the demonstration. In 
the early hours of May 23, 2006 the majority of the handmade banners, photographs, 
placards, and artwork against war were dismantled and taken away by the police on the basis 
they were in breach of the conditions imposed on the demonstration. However, a few days 
before their destruction Wallinger had taken hundreds of photographs of the worn and 
tattered signs, objects and messages of goodwill. These were then used to recreate the 
weathered protest materials with painstaking attention to detail in order to form State Britain. 
The installation created a striking contrast with the elegant surrounds of the architecture and 
other exhibits of Tate Britain, where it was displayed during January 2007 (figures one and 
two). 
 
[Insert Figure 3. Brian Haw’s peace camp. April 2006. Parliament Square, London. 
Photograph by Mark Wallinger] 
 
The power to control demonstrations in the vicinity of Parliament had been given to the 
police by SOCPA after a report by the House of Commons Procedure Committee. The report 
had recommended the introduction of legislation to prohibit long-term demonstrations and to 
ensure that the laws regarding access to Parliament were adequate and enforceable.
7
 In April 
2002 Prime Minister Tony Blair had said, “I pass protesters every day at Downing Street, and 
believe me, you name it, they protest against it. I may not like what they call me but I thank 
God they can. That's called freedom."
8
 However, in the debate on the report and the 
Government’s response to it,  it was argued this freedom had to be balanced against the need 
to ensure access to Parliament, which was regarded as essential to protect “its working and to 
our democracy.”9 Ms Hazel Blears, Minister of State at the Home Office, with 
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responsibilities for policing, crime reduction and counter terrorism, had dismissed the value 
and significance of longstanding protests in the course of giving evidence to the Procedure 
Committee’s inquiry. She commented, “Demonstrations have tended to come and go when 
things have been politically controversial, even for perhaps as long as six months there might 
be a presence, but if things were going to go on well beyond the time of the controversy then 
we have got a situation where a demonstration is not even connected to the issues that are 
being debated as the issue of the day, and I do not think that is about democracy.”10  
 
SOCPA was a large piece of legislation and its primary purpose was the creation of the 
Serious Organized Crime Agency. The provisions that regulated demonstrations in the 
vicinity of Parliament formed a relatively small part of the Act. The zone defined by the 
legislation was circular and at no point more than 1 kilometer in a straight line from 
Parliament Square (‘circular zone’). It was this area that included within it part of the Duveen 
Galleries of Tate Britain. As mentioned earlier, State Britain was positioned deliberately so 
that it bisected the boundary of the circular zone, which was marked out by Wallinger on the 
floor of the gallery (figures two and four). Under SOCPA subordinate legislation could be 
used by the Secretary of State to specify a designated area, which had to fall entirely within 
the circular zone (‘designated area’).11 Inside the designated area all demonstrations had to be 
notified to the police and a failure to do so was an offence, which could lead to a 
conviction.
12
 The police were required to give demonstrations of which they were notified 
authorisation under section 134 of the Act; but the Police Commissioner could then impose 
conditions that in his “reasonable opinion” were necessary to prevent any of seven types of 
event that in broad terms related to public safety.
13
 The definition of these section 134 public 
safety purposes ranged from being relatively specific, such as causing a “hindrance to any 
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person wishing to enter or leave the Palace of Westminster,” to the vaguer and more wide 
ranging “disruption to the life of the community or “serious public disorder.”14 
 
[Insert Figure 4. State Britain, 2007. Mixed media installation, 5.7 x 43 x 1.9m (approx). 
Detail, installation at Tate Britain, 2007. Photograph by David Morgan. Courtesy the artist 
and Hauser & Wirth.] 
 
Although it was generally accepted that the ability to police protests was necessary, SOCPA 
was criticised during the course of its enactment for introducing disproportionate restrictions 
on freedom of expression.  The point was made that the Act appeared to be specifically 
directed at Haw.
15
 More generally, it was argued that the extent of the area of the circular 
zone was “clearly excessive.”16 It was complained there had been an uncritical over-reliance 
on advice from the police in determining the parameters of both it and the designated area. 
The observation was made that the underlying reasoning behind the circular zone and the 
designated area remained unknown.
 17
  Concern was expressed about the power given to the 
Secretary of State to use subordinate legislation to create the designated area by means of an 
order. Whilst any such order could be debated it could not be amended but only either 
accepted or rejected.
 18
 In addition the scope of the police discretion to define activities as 
demonstrations was also criticized.
19
 Against these objections it was argued the powers were 
not intended to prevent freedom of expression and were needed because of the status of 
Parliament and any protests that hindered its proper operation would not be in the interests of 
democracy.
20
  
 
The conditions that the police were able to impose on protests under SOCPA were restrictive 
of forms of expression regarded as unacceptable and as such amounted to censorship when 
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understood in a narrow and conventional sense of the word.
21
 I have already mentioned that it 
was an offence to organise a demonstration in the designated area without notifying the 
police. It was also an offence to knowingly fail to comply with any conditions imposed under 
the Act. In such situations the organiser of a demonstration was liable to be convicted of a 
criminal offence and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
22
 However, SOCPA was also 
framed in such a way that it would encourage protests to conform with unstated norms as to 
what was considered proper behaviour in the vicinity of Parliament. This was because of the 
lack of specificity in the definition of what constituted a demonstration. The Act provided 
simply that a demonstration had to be in a “public place” but that was defined broadly to 
include, amongst other things, “any place to which at the material time the public or any 
section of the public has access, on payment or otherwise, as of right or by virtue of express 
or implied permission.”23 In the course of Parliamentary debate it was stated the 
implementation of SOCPA relied on, “a combination of the experience of the police, 
common sense, and the application of the judgments of the courts. That is the means by 
which we define demonstrations.”24 This meant the legislation placed the initial onus on 
individuals to decide, without any clear legislative guidance, what constituted a 
demonstration that had to be notified to the police. As a consequence the Act was censorship 
in a broader and formative sense in that it involved the “regulation of the social domain of 
speakable discourse” within which democratic protest could be expressed.25 
 
SOCPA was just one piece of legislation in a network of various rules, laws and regulations 
that protect the area around Parliament due to its architectural, historical and symbolic 
significance.
26
 The Houses of Parliament, Westminster Abbey and the nearby St Margaret’s 
Church are, for example, included on the UNESCO list of World Heritage Sites.
27
 Parliament 
Square Garden is registered as an English Heritage Grade II Registered Garden of Special 
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Historic Interest under the Historic Buildings and Ancient Monuments Act 1953. The Greater 
London Authority, which has described the location as both “at the heart of Contemporary 
British Politics” and as “an area of significant historic and symbolic value to the British 
People and many others worldwide” is able to make and enforce byelaws to secure the proper 
management of Parliament Square.
28
 The law privileges and seeks to perpetuate the 
buildings, art and events in and around Parliament that have an established association with 
the United Kingdom’s parliamentary democracy.  One instance of this is the “dominance of 
19
th
 and 20
th
 Century white men” represented in the statues situated in the area and nearby 
streets.
29
 All of which makes the vicinity a potent site not only for protest about political 
issues but also for contestation over the way in which demonstrations are regulated and 
policed.
30
 In short, SOCPA contributed to both the restriction and the production of activity 
and behaviour that is considered appropriate to the United Kingdom’s parliamentary 
democracy. 
 
The way in which SOCPA gave added force to the production of “certain norms governing 
what is speakable and what is not” was identified and objected to even before the debate on 
the subordinate legislation that created the designated area around Parliament Square.
31
  A 
group called ‘People in Common’ had started to have a weekly “tea parties” in Parliament 
Square Gardens in front of the House of Commons. A press release by the group described 
the meetings as, “aimed towards a DIY, non-hierarchical participatory form of democracy.”32 
Mark Thomas, an artist and activist, later mocked the police in a newspaper article for having 
threatened with arrest a woman who had brought a cake with the word ‘peace’ iced on it to 
one of the picnics.
33
 As already mentioned, such activities exposed the organisers to the 
danger of being convicted simply for failing to provide notification of what the police 
subsequently regarded as a demonstration. These and other actions brought into question the 
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notion that what constituted a demonstration was a matter of common sense and drew 
attention to the way SOCPA sought to produce behaviour that conformed to what was 
considered to be suitable for the vicinity of Parliament.
 34
 Under the United Kingdom’s 
existing system of parliamentary democracy there is a ban that prevents voting by prisoners 
who are serving a custodial sentence.
35
 Approached in such terms there were those who 
objected to SOCPA who took “the risk of being cast out into the unspeakable.”36 Although 
the provisions of the legislation that enabled the police to control demonstrations in the area 
around  Parliament Square were eventually repealed they were replaced by the Police Reform 
and Social Responsibility Act 2011.
 37
   
 
III. Art and the Performative 
 
On the day of the press opening of State Britain at Tate Britain a politician from the Labour 
government called in to a radio programme to say, “This is exactly where his [Haw’s] protest 
belongs.”38  The curator and artist Dean Kenning commented that such a view “relies on the 
old modernist suspicion that museums are the mausolea of radicality.”39 This illustrated that 
the visual identity between Haw’s protest and State Britain meant there was a risk the 
artwork would simply be regarded as the calcified remains of the demonstration. The 
tendency to do this may have been encouraged by a common lack of precision in accounts of 
State Britain’s bisection of the circular zone. The Tate, for example, describes the work as 
having been partially situated inside the “exclusion zone.” 40 However, no part of it fell within 
the boundaries of the designated area, which had to be entirely within the circular zone’s 
boundary. As I described earlier, it was only inside the smaller space of the designated area 
that the police could impose restrictions on demonstrations. My argument is that although no 
part of Wallinger’s work fell inside the designated area this did not mean its bisection of the 
State Britain and the Art of (Im)proper Democratic Protest  - final draft after review 
10 
 
circular zone was simply a rhetorical gesture. In this regard, my starting point is to situate 
State Britain in the context of the art historical heritage it shared with readymades such as the 
work Fountain by the artist Marcel Duchamp. As the art historian Benjamin Buchloh has 
identified Duchamp’s readymades drew attention to the performative nature of art given that, 
by declaring everyday objects to be works of art, he had inaugurated “a new aesthetic of the 
speech act (‘this is a work of art if I say so’)”41 There are a range of approaches to 
performatives but my argument depends on understanding their nature through the work of 
Jacques Derrida.
42
   
 
Derrida argues performatives function because they can be repeated or more accurately 
because they are iterable.
43
 The iterability of a performative means it has a force that makes 
possible self-identity.
44
 As Derrida explains, “[i]terability requires the origin to repeat itself 
originarily, to alter itself so as to have the value of origin, that is, to conserve itself.”45 This 
means the way in which work declares itself as visual art must be acknowledged and 
enforced by theory, conventions and institutions.
 46
 Art that appropriates, such as Duchamp’s 
readymades, draws attention to the interpretive and organisational frameworks that iterate the 
non-originary origins which are the conditions of possibility of art. Expressed more generally, 
in performative terms visual art may only be understood as such in terms of the tradition it 
inherits even if it does not simply repeat that heritage when it is affirmed as art.
47
 This is 
illustrated by State Britain, which was recognised as being by an acknowledged artist, 
immediately accepted into Tate Britain and then won critical acclaim and was awarded the 
Turner Prize in December 2007.
 48
 Of course, as Derrida points out, there is in turn always 
another and yet more powerful system of “laws and social conventions that legitimates all 
these things.”49 Tate Britain, for example, is situated in a network of relationships regulated 
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by the Museums and Galleries Act 1992 under which all the Tate’s property, rights and 
liabilities are entrusted in its Board of Trustees.  
 
Whilst iterability enables self-identity it also brings with it the possibility of a break with 
every established state of affairs. It is this possibility for a performative rupture that Judith 
Butler focuses on when she says that for Derrida, “The force of the performative is thus not 
inherited from prior usage, but issues forth precisely from its break with any and all prior 
usage.” 50 Iterability means there may be invention, understood in terms of that which “did 
not appear to be possible; otherwise it only makes explicit a program of possibilities within 
the economy of the same.”51 It is because of iterability that it is possible to have work, such 
as Duchamp’s readymades, that breaks with established theories and conventions so as to 
bring about a change in what is accepted as art. Yet, if Wallinger’s work drew attention to 
this it also invited those who encountered State Britain to realise that the law is, as Julie 
Stone Peters has put it, the “ultimate performative institution.”52 As such, iterability provides 
a means to account for the way in which SOCPA could have determined that State Britain 
was a demonstration. This was implicitly acknowledged by the artist and curator Richard 
Grayson when he pointed out that Wallinger’s freedom of expression was “profoundly 
different” inside the boundary of the circular zone by comparison with the area more than 1 
kilometer beyond Parliament Square.
 53
 As the boundary of the designated area was defined 
by delegated legislation, it could be changed by the Secretary of State simply by means of an 
order.
 
Grayson appreciated that, as a simulacrum, had State Britain at any time fallen inside 
an expanded designated area it could have become subject to conditions imposed by the 
police under SOCPA.
54
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My argument is that, when understood in terms of Derrida’s work, as a simulacrum State 
Britain had the effect of inviting a response that not only looked backwards in time but also 
forwards to the future.
 55 
The bisection of the boundary of the circular zone by Wallinger’s 
work drew attention to the way that meaning is a product of the “systematic play of 
differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are 
related to each other.”56 To give an account of the work in these terms is to interpret it 
through différance, which is Derrida’s neologism for the way meaning emerges out of a 
diachronic process of deferral in time as much as difference in space. Wallinger’s work 
contested the logic of model and copy. State Britain trembled between being perceived as a 
work in terms of the past form of Haw’s demonstration and a future in which it might itself 
be regarded as a protest and subjected to restrictions under SOCPA. The demarcation on the 
floor of Tate Britain of a segment of the circular zone boundary focussed attention on the 
importance in State Britain of both place and time. The oscillation of the work across that 
border generated a tension that drew attention to the way the boundary between the speakable 
and the unspeakable might be redrawn in the future and the risks this could potentially bring 
with it, which might even have retrospective effect under the law.
57
  
 
IV. Boundary Issues 
 
State Britain, by crossing the boundary of the circular zone, invited people to focus on the 
designated area, which might be changed without the need for an Act of Parliament. An 
expansion in the designated area potentially had implications for the work’s exhibition in 
Tate Britain as an institutionally acknowledged work of art. In the event that all or part of the 
gallery fell inside the designated area would Wallinger’s work of art, or a section of it, be 
regarded as a demonstration? If State Britain, either in part or in its entirety, fell inside the 
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designated area would the police impose s.134 public safety conditions on it? Assuming that 
such restrictions were imposed, was there a risk that the part of State Britain installed inside 
the circular zone would be dismantled and removed by the police; and if not, why not? 
Would it make any sense that State Britain could pose a public safety concern on one side of 
the boundary inside the art gallery but not on the other? As the work was situated beyond the 
designated area, these questions might have seemed only remotely relevant to the protection 
of Parliament. But, in that case why was the circular zone the size it was and what would 
have happened if Wallinger had installed his institutionally recognised artwork in Parliament 
Square? By directing attention to such issues State Britain invited people to become aware 
that common sense could not be relied upon to provide clear and unequivocal guidance as to 
what constituted a demonstration for the purposes of SOCPA. Of course, as I have already 
mentioned, this was also illustrated by other actions that took place inside the designated 
area. However, Wallinger’s work differed from those demonstrations in that the questions 
posed by its oscillation could be deferred and did not need to be answered by the police in the 
course of enforcing the Act. I will come onto why that deferral was significant through a 
discussion of the way in which State Britain’s fluctuations across the boundary of the circular 
zone invited reflection on the violence of the law.  
 
In the event the designated area had been expanded to include State Britain within it the 
questions that Wallinger’s work had at the outset posed hypothetically would have become 
live issues. The decisions made in response would have been important given that the 
legislation had been enacted to protect Parliament and a law is meaningless unless enforced.
58
 
Even so, the way in which State Britain trembled between being a work of art and a 
demonstration need not have given rise to any anxiety when viewed from the perspective of 
positive law. Any decisions made about Wallinger’s work would have been valid if grounded 
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in the legitimacy of existing law. The way in which Wallinger’s work might be dealt with 
would be a matter for determination by the police in accordance with SOCPA. The courts 
were there to ensure that the police acted correctly as required under the Act. The Court of 
Appeal’s decision that the wording of SOCPA applied to Haw had already illustrated that, if 
necessary, the legislation would be interpreted in accordance with applicable legal principles. 
It might be the case that the oscillation of the work drew attention both to the contingent 
nature of the boundaries constructed by SOCPA and how it might be problematic at times to 
use common sense to determine what amounted to a demonstration. However, approached in 
terms of positive law, State Britain could be dismissed as generating esoteric, “hard cases at 
the edges of law, rather than raising issues central to the very nature and structure of law.”59 
Nevertheless, I propose that it was precisely by opening such apparently marginal questions 
that State Britain invited a “dissensus, that makes visible what the dominant consensus tends 
to obscure and obliterate.”60  
 
Clearly, given that State Britain did not fall inside the designated area, the police never had 
the scope to impose any conditions on the work, irrespective of whether they might have 
viewed it as a protest or not. But, as already proposed, the bisection of the boundary of the 
circular zone by Wallinger’s work invited those who encountered it to reflect on what might 
happen if the designated area were expanded to include within it part of Tate Britain. In such 
a case Wallinger, or perhaps the Trustees of the Tate, would have needed to decide if they 
had to notify the police of the work’s installation. Assuming the police had been notified then 
they might, or perhaps might not, have then imposed conditions on State Britain as had been 
done with Haw’s protest. This scenario opened the prospect that Wallinger’s work may not 
have been regarded as a demonstration by reason of its position inside Tate Britain given the 
laws and conventions that regulate behaviour in art galleries and museums.
61
 However, if the 
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status of the gallery had led to such a decision then surely this would have resulted in it being 
asked whether any other locations within the designated area might have had a similar effect?  
State Britain focused attention on an unavoidable problem that confronts any given legal 
system. It provided a context to realise that “the generality of the law is heterogeneous to the 
specificity of the case.”62 The context of Wallinger’s installation invited the realisation that 
the claim the law makes for the generality of its application is fundamentally incompatible 
with regulating any particular case exclusively in terms of the merits of its own specific 
circumstances.
63
 State Britain illustrated that, as is the case for any law, SOCPA could not 
“be general enough not to be violent, not to engender exceptions or instances of counter-
violence.”64  
 
State Britain did not only invite awareness that SOCPA could not address the singularity of 
the individual whilst at the same time seeking to realise the generality that the law claims for 
itself.
65
 The work was also exemplary because the undecidable relationship between the 
general and the singular, which it focused attention on by oscillating across the boundary of 
the circular zone, translates the iterability of the law.
66
 The way in which the work drew 
attention to this translation may be approached through the observation by Chantal Mouffe 
that, “[w]hat is at a given moment considered as the ‘natural’ order – jointly with the 
‘common sense’ which accompanies it – is the result of sedimented hegemonic practices; it is 
never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into 
being.”67 As already discussed, Wallinger’s work problematized the extent to which the 
enforcement of SOCPA relied on common sense to determine what constituted a 
demonstration. In turn this invited reflection on why the legislation, framed in the way it was, 
should be needed to prevent demonstrations that it was concerned would prevent the proper 
operation of Parliament. Approached in this way, State Britain’s juxtaposition with SOCPA 
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could not be disentangled from the way in which the Act brought the force of the law to bear 
in order to ensure the continued functioning of the United Kingdom’s highest source of law. 
The fluctuations of Wallinger’s work invited an engagement with the way that the violent 
inauguration of a legal framework is iterated by legislation that is enacted, interpreted and 
enforced under that same system.
 68
  
 .  
State Britain drew attention to SOCPA’s contribution to the continued operation of 
Parliament, which was of course the origin of the Act itself.  The inquiry into the need for the 
legislation that Wallinger’s work invited might then have led onto reflection about 
Parliament, the way it works, and why it has the authority to pass legislation such as SOCPA. 
The origin and force of the law may be traced back to a rupture with a previous legal system. 
As Margaret Davies puts it, “The legitimate history of a legal system has a stopping point 
where the legality or illegality of a particular act is undecidable. For instance, a successful 
coup d’état is defined by the fact that an act which is illegal under the pre-existing legal order 
becomes the source of all legality.”69 In other words, at some point it will not be possible to 
find a legal justification for an existing system of law. The bisection of the circular zone by 
State Britain provided a context for the acknowledgement of the non-originary origins of the 
law. However, the violence of a legal system’s foundation does not provide a basis for the 
outright rejection of the law given that it cannot avoid being violent. As William Sokoloff 
points out, Derrida “does not reject law but puts pressure on it to be something more than 
maintenance of dominant power relations of the community.”70 An established legal order 
can do so by acknowledging, rather than disavowing, its violence. SOCPA failed to do this 
given that, for example, the police had the discretion to determine what constituted a 
demonstration on the basis of common sense and their advice as to where to locate the Act’s 
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boundaries had been accepted uncritically. By contrast, State Britain focused attention on the 
troubling way that SOCPA shored up what was considered appropriate democratic conduct. 
 
At this point I return to the significance of the way that State Britain created a context in 
which it might be realised the application of SOCPA could be problematic whilst not actually 
triggering the need to apply the Act. As institutionally recognised art the work’s oscillation 
across the border of the circular zone not only drew attention to the legislation but also 
“wider processes, tendencies and dynamics” by which the United Kingdom’s parliamentary 
democracy is guarded.
71
  State Britain invited, for example, a comparison between it and the 
art that was considered suitable for the vicinity of Parliament. The conditions imposed on 
Haw’s demonstration by the police suggested that Wallinger’s work would not be considered 
suitable for inclusion in Parliament Square alongside the statues of Winston Churchill or 
Nelson Mandela. State Britain drew attention to the way that established aesthetic values are 
part of “the realm of sedimented practices, that is practices that conceal the original acts of 
their contingent political institution and which are taken for granted, as if they were self-
grounded.”72 Such social norms are not only enforced by laws such as SOCPA they also 
operate to inform and constrain what legislation is created and how it is understood.
73
 These 
values intertwine with the law so as to secure the existing form of parliamentary democracy 
in the United Kingdom.
74
 SOCPA was enacted in such a way as to enable a disavowal of the 
contingency of the artistic values that contextualised its enforcement. By comparison, 
Wallinger’s work provided an opening to perceive art in terms of the political understood as 
the, “ever present possibility of antagonism”, which necessitates an acknowledgement of the 
“lack of a final ground and the undecidability which pervades every order.”75 In short, State 
Britain invited the recognition that, as Mouffe puts it, “[t]here is an aesthetic dimension in the 
political and there is a political dimension in art.”76  
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The juxtaposition of Wallinger’s work with SOCPA opened a space to engage with the way 
in which the stability of the social sphere remains “relative, even if it is sometimes so great as 
to seem immutable and permanent.”77 This may be understood in terms of Derrida’s 
argument that, “Undecidability is always a determinate oscillation between possibilities (for 
example, of meaning, but also of acts). These possibilities are themselves highly determined 
in strictly defined situations (for example, discursive – syntactical or rhetorical – but also 
political, ethical etc). They are pragmatically determined.”78 State Britain’s bisection of the 
boundary of the circular zone drew attention to the way that the possibilities between which 
the work vibrated were not determined solely by SOCPA. There were objects and activities 
within the borders created under the legislation that were protected by other means, such as 
well-established aesthetic values, from the possibility of even being considered as (part of) a 
political demonstration. A recent example of that kind might include, for example, 
participation in the ‘Parliament in the Making’ programme held in 2015 to celebrate the 
Magna Carta.
79
 However, iterability brings with it the promise that “[t]he frontier between the 
social and the political is essentially unstable and requires constant displacements and 
renegotiations between social agents.” 80 Expressed in terms of Derrida’s work, this is 
because “iterability blurs a priori the dividing line.”81 The intersection of Wallinger’s work 
with SOCPA drew attention, in both legal and aesthetic terms, to the possibility of 
reactivating the calcification of the established social order. Crucially, State Britain did so 
whilst at the same time inviting awareness of the “process of selection [that] appears to 
presuppose a decision.”82 The oscillation of the work opened a space to acknowledge the 
“unarticulated assumptions, implications and effects” that structure and constrain decisions 
about, amongst other things, what activities are considered to be acceptable demonstrations 
against the established political order.
83
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My argument is that State Britain was an invitation to engage with what, in an established 
democracy such as the United Kingdom, may at times be relatively subtle constraints and 
complexities involved in acting “within the code contrary to the code.”84 Wallinger’s work 
created a context that encouraged those who encountered it to become aware that what is 
regarded as an (un)acceptable democratic protest is not something that is “simply a matter of 
chance and will” but nor is it determined by an individual piece of legislation.85 The way in 
which SOCPA regulated demonstrations may have given undue latitude to the discretion of 
the police but, as eventually happened, it could be repealed. However, understood in terms of 
iterability, the legal system was affirmed by the enactment, interpretation, enforcement and 
even the eventual repeal of the legislation. Moreover, the political establishment is entangled 
in aesthetic values, which are themselves constantly subject to affirmation through a network 
of entrenched art practices, conventions and institutions. The fluctuation of State Britain 
between being recognised as a work of art and a protest invited a critical attitude towards 
efforts to protect democracy not only through the application of common sense enforced by 
the application of the law but also by means of what was considered aesthetically acceptable. 
The work opened a space to see the need for “dissident and inventive rupture with respect to 
tradition, authority, orthodoxy, rule, or doctrine” and it did so whilst inviting the 
acknowledgement this cannot be effective unless the complex systems of constraints that 
frame such criticality are not disavowed.
86
  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In a democracy a determination always has to be made as to where the lines are to be drawn 
between the freedom to act and being held responsible by the law. State Britain, as did other 
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protests directed at SOCPA, focussed attention on the way in which the legislation sought to 
ensure that protest activity in the vicinity of Parliament was acceptable to the existing 
political establishment. Wallinger’s work invited those who encountered it to reflect on the 
potential the law had to determine it was a demonstration. State Britain opened a context in 
which to imagine situations in which, as had been the case with Haw’s demonstration, the 
police might dismantle it. In the process, Wallinger’s work encouraged people to think about 
why it was problematic to protect democracy through the contingencies enforced by SOCPA. 
However, as a protest the effectiveness of State Britain was not limited to inviting those who 
encountered it to reflect on the vagaries of where the circular zone and the designated area 
were respectively positioned or the uncertainties of what would be regarded as a 
demonstration. The oscillation of State Britain across the boundary of the circular zone 
focussed attention on the highest source of law in the United Kingdom. Not only did the 
location of Parliament frame the possibilities of efforts to control demonstrations but SOCPA 
was itself the outcome of the proper Parliamentary processes the legislation had been enacted 
to protect. SOCPA disavowed the violence of the legal system by which it had been enacted 
and was enforced by treating the issue of what constituted a demonstration as a matter of 
common sense. Although it is unavoidable for any legal system not to be violent there is 
scope for this to be lessened by acknowledgement of the law’s non-originary origins.87 I have 
sought to argue that Wallinger’s work did this but not simply by encouraging a perception of 
SOCPA as an outcome that was simply arbitrary or accidental. The creation of the legislation 
and the boundaries constructed under it were predicated on the existence, location and 
operation of Parliament. 
 
Wallinger’s work did not only provide an opportunity to acknowledge the violence of the law 
in determining what was regarded as a demonstration; it also invited awareness of the way in 
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which established aesthetic values work to secure the political establishment. State Britain 
opened a context in which to engage with the conventions and laws that determined the work 
could be encountered in Tate Britain as art. The juxtaposition of State Britain with the 
boundary of the circular zone invited those who encountered it to reflect on the performative 
conditions of possibility of art. Wallinger’s work focussed attention on the way that protest 
materials identical to those removed by the police from Haw’s demonstration in Parliament 
Square were accepted into and framed by Tate Britain as art at the same time that it invited 
reflection on the way that the enactment of SOCPA was predicated on the existence of 
Parliament. Crucially, in doing so Wallinger’s work did not only reactivate the boundary 
between the sedimentation of the social and the agonism of the political in legal terms. The 
oscillation of the work simultaneously drew attention both to the borders constructed by 
SOCPA and the way in which the nation’s parliamentary democracy is enveloped within 
established aesthetic values, which determine the sort of work that is considered acceptable 
for the vicinity of Parliament. My argument is that keeping open the possibility of inventive 
engagements with democracy must involve challenging the assumptions, processes and 
institutions that underpin such artistic and cultural values. This is not simply a matter of 
acknowledging the contingencies of how democracy is realised and commemorated but also 
requires identification of the ways in which the prospects of bringing about change are 
constrained by systems of prevailing power. Democracy does not only require the sustained 
and permanent critique of entrenched legal institutions and frameworks. It is also necessary to 
engage with the aesthetic values and other norms that shackle challenges to the political 
establishment. Of course this involves risks, as it cannot be known in advance were a refusal 
to unquestioningly comply with dominant relationships of power will lead. However, critical 
engagements with the complex entanglements that secure the political establishment are 
necessary in order to leave open the promise of a more democratic society.
88
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